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It’s quite amazing that in the span of four short pages, John Bell can
make the pioneers of quantum mechanics seem collectively like just so many
addle-brains. I’m speaking here of Bell’s article “Subject and object” (1987).
I cannot deny the rhetorical effectiveness of this article. In fact, I consider
it a model for how one can — with the effective application of insinuation
and rhetorical question — render a view seemingly unworthy of serious con-
sideration. Nonetheless, I cannot hold Bell’s paper up as a paradigm of
philosophical inquiry, because he gives so little effort to understanding what
others were saying. We can do better, and we must do better, if we’re ever
going to make progress with the foundations of quantum physics.
Bell begins his article by claiming that:
1. Quantum mechanics is fundamentally about the results of ‘measure-
ments’.
2. The subject-object distinction is needed for quantum mechanics, but
3. “Exactly where or when to make it [i.e. the subject-object distinction]
is not prescribed.” (p 40)
Bell then says that (3) is a serious defect that makes quantum mechan-
ics “vague” and “intrinsically ambiguous” and “only approximately self-
consistent.”
Let me begin by saying that I simply deny (1), i.e. that quantum mechan-
ics is fundamentally about the results of measurements. I’m afraid that Bell
has himself made a logical leap from “the quantum mechanical formalism
needs a user” to “quantum mechanics is fundamentally about the results of
measurements.” There is a wide range of possibilities between these two ex-
tremes — e.g. that the quantum-mechanical formalism provides a means for
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translating facts about subatomic reality into a language that human beings
can understand.
I will grant that Bell is correct about (2), that the subject-object distinc-
tion is needed for quantum mechanics, but unfortunately, Bell has misun-
derstood the sense in which it is needed. He seems to think that quantum
mechanics must describe the world as bifurcated into two parts — subject
and object. If that were correct, then I would completely understand Bell’s
unease with the distinction. If the theory describes a world with two parts,
then the theory should offer some guidance about what belongs to each part.
But if you think about the meaning the word “subject”, it quickly be-
comes obvious that it’s not supposed to play the role of a predicate in the
theory (unlike, say, “electron”). Rather, the idea is that a subject uses the
theory to describe objects — and in the case at hand, these objects fall under
the laws of quantum mechanics. The theory sees no subjects, it sees only ob-
jects, and so it has no need for specifying where and when the subject-object
split occurs. Such a split is a necessary prerequisite to physical theorizing,
when a subject decides to use a theory to try to say something true about
the world.
Now what about the complaint that quantum mechanics does not specify
who the subject is, or when and where and how she decides to use the theory?
But wait a minute. Is there any theory that does that? What an amazing
theory it would be! Indeed, such a theory would fulfill Hegel’s aspiration of
finally unifying the subject and object. In other words, such a theory would
“theorize itself.” Is Bell suggesting that quantum mechanics is defective
because it doesn’t yet achieve the Hegelian Aufhebung of the subject-object
distinction?
So, in short, Bell is correct that quantum mechanics, as it stands, needs
a subject. But that is true of every theory that has ever appeared in physics
— i.e. these theories need subjects to decide when and where and how to
describe things.
Bell’s subsequent rhetoric in the article is effective only against the back-
drop of his false assumption that the subject must appear in the quantum-
mechanical description. For example, Bell raises a question for which quan-
tum mechanics doesn’t appear to have an answer.
“Now must this subject include a person? Or was there already
some such subject-object distinction before the appearance of life
in the universe?” (p 40)
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But quantum mechanics is simply not interested in the question of what
counts as a subject. If you ask me what counts as a subject, then my answer
is that anyone who can use a theory to describe things is a subject — no other
qualifications are necessary! If your dog can theorize, then he is a subject,
and if an artificial intelligence could theorize, then it would also be a subject.
And to Bell’s second question, I suspect that before the appearance of “life”
in the universe, there were no things that could describe other things, and
hence no subjects. But that doesn’t mean that we subjects, living today,
cannot describe the universe as it was before the existence of any subjects.
In fact, the entire point of the subject-object distinction is that when a
subject S is treating some X as an object, then it is indifferent to S whether
X is also a subject — because as far as S is concerned, X is merely an object.
If you now ask me, but is X really a subject or an object? Here I say that
the question is misguided. Those two categories are not mutually exclusive.
Without a doubt, each subject in our world can be an object of some subject’s
description. So perhaps what you want is a more comprehensive theory that
answers the question of who or what can be a subject. But then who would
be the subject who uses that theory, and must she wait for the theory to tell
her that she is a subject before she can make use of it? I feel that we have
now swum into deep metaphysical waters. For the business of physics, is it
not enough that the subjects know who they are?
Due to misunderstanding the role of the subject in quantum mechanics,
Bell also falsely accuses quantum mechanics of being “intrinsically ambigu-
ous and approximate” (p 41, emphasis in original). If quantum mechanics
does not describe a world split into subject and object, then where is the am-
biguity supposed to appear? If Bell says that the ambiguity arises in what
quantum mechanics is intended to describe — i.e. what counts as the object
— then I would ask how that is different from any other physical theory.
Take one of Bell’s favorite theories: Bohmian mechanics. What is Bohmian
mechanics supposed to describe? You might say: it describes particles fol-
lowing deterministic trajectories. But then I would ask: which particles,
and which trajectories? You see, even in Bohmian mechanics, it’s left to
the discrimination of the theoretical physicist to decide how many particles,
which Hamiltonian, when the interaction turns on and off, etc.1 So, if stan-
1Consider, for example, the Bohmian description of a momentum measurement: Ac-
cording to Norsen, “one could ‘turn off’ the potential energy V (x) which confines the
electron to the vicinity of the origin . . . ” (Norsen, 2017, p 196). To echo Bell’s question,
exactly where and when is the potential energy turned off?
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dard quantum mechanics is “intrinsically ambiguous and approximate” how
is that not also the case for Bohmian mechanics?
In “Subject and object”, Bell slices and dices his opponent — a straw
person of Bell’s own making. The real problem, I think, is that Bell wants a
theory that has no need for a subject.
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